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Abstract
We study the classic sequential screening problem in the presence of ex-post participation con-
straints. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions that determine exhaustively when the
optimal selling mechanism is either static or sequential. In the static contract, the buyers are not
screened with respect to their interim type and the object is sold at a posted price. In the sequen-
tial contract, the buyers are screened with respect to their interim type and a menu of quantities is
offered.
We completely characterize the optimal sequential contract with binary interim types and a
continuum of ex-post values. Importantly, the optimal sequential contract randomizes the allocation
of the low type buyer while giving a deterministic allocation to the high type. Finally, we provide
additional results for the case of multiple interim types.
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Sequential screening models have been used extensively in economics and revenue management to study
optimal contract design when buyers learn their values over time. In the classic formulation of sequential
screening pioneered by Courty and Li (2000), a profit-maximizing seller (he) faces a single buyer (she),
or alternatively a continuum of buyers. The buyer initially has partial and private information about
her value, for example the mean, and privately learns her true value at some later time. In the classic
setting, each buyer is required to participate ex interim: her expected gains at the time of contracting
have to exceed their outside option. A salient example discussed by Courty and Li (2000) is the airline
industry in which travelers purchase tickets in advance, but may only realize their true value once the
date of the trip approaches.
Even though the optimal contracts that arise may offer partial refunds, the initial advanced price
is large enough such that some travelers experience negative ex-post utility while still being willing to
participate interim. This situation arises in other industries as well, such as hotels, theaters or even
railroads where advanced pricing and partial refunds type contracts are also offered.
In many online markets, however, the seller is constrained to sell products in such a way that the
buyer obtains a non-negative net utility once she has realized her value, thus ex-post. For example, in
online shopping buyers may have the chance to return a purchased item after delivery, usually at zero
or low cost (Krähmer and Strausz (2015)). In the online display advertising market, typical business
constraints prohibit publishers from using up-front fees (Balseiro, Mirrokni, and Paes Leme (2018)).
Instead the publishers run auctions, typically some version of first or second-price auctions that satisfy
the ex-post participation constraints. Thus, the seller needs to guarantee participation not only initially
– at the interim level – but also after the buyers have completely learned their value – at the ex-post
level.
Motivated by these new markets, we study the sequential screening problem as described by Courty
and Li (2000) and incorporate ex-post participation constraints. Ex-post participation constraints rule
out the optimal contracts derived by Courty and Li (2000) with up-front fees. As pointed out by Krähmer
and Strausz (2015) because different up-front fees cannot be used to price discriminate the different
buyers, it may be that a static contract, one that does not screen the buyers interim, becomes optimal
under ex-post participation constraints. Building on the work by Krähmer and Strausz (2015), our
objective is to understand when the optimal selling mechanism is static (buyers are not screened interim)
or sequential (buyers are screened interim), and to obtain a full characterization of such contracts. Our
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work highlights the significant revenue improvements that can be attained by using a sequential contract
relative to a static one, even in the presence of ex-post participation constraints.
Our model considers a seller who is selling at most one unit of an object to a buyer. The sequence
of events unfolds in two periods. In the first period, the buyer privately learns her interim type, for
example the mean of her value distribution, and the parties contract. We begin the analysis assuming
binary interim types of the buyer, thus high and low. The high type has a distribution of ex-post
values that dominates the distribution of the low type in some stochastic order. The contract specifies
allocation and payments as a function of reported interim type and ex-post value. In the second period,
the buyer privately learns her value, and allocations and transfers are realized. At this point, the buyer
accepts the contracting terms only if her realized net utility is weakly larger than her outside option.
This model aligns with our aforementioned examples. In online shopping, the first period corresponds
to the purchasing time. At this time the buyer possesses private information about her expected value
but she only learns her true realized value in the subsequent period. In the second period, the buyer is
delivered the item and has the option to return it, at low or no cost. In the case of display advertising,
some publishers use a sequence of auctions known as “waterfall auctions” that implicitly impose different
priorities over participants.1 Commonly, higher-priority auctions have higher reserve prices. The first
period can be thought of as the time at which the buyer decides in which auction (priority/reserve) to
participate. The second period is when the auctions are actually run.
1.2 Results
The first main result characterizes when a static contract—that is, a contract that does not sequentially
screen buyers—is optimal. In Theorem 1, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the
optimality of the static contract, termed profit-to-rent condition. In the optimal static contract the
seller offers a single and uniform price to all types.
In Theorem 2, we characterize the optimal mechanism when this profit-to-rent condition fails and
a static contract is no longer optimal. The scope for a revenue improvement through a sequential
contract is perhaps easiest to grasp by assuming for a moment that the seller were to know the interim
type. From this, admittedly hypothetical, perspective, the uniform static price is too high for the low
type and too low for the high type. As each type has a different ex-post distribution of values, the
seller would ideally like to better tailor the price to the distribution of ex-post values. To increase
his revenue relative to the static contract, the seller could try to increase the price for the high type
1See, for example, https://adexchanger.com/the-sell-sider/the-programmatic-waterfall-mystery. A similar dynamic oc-
curs when sellers offer “preferred deals” to advertisers (see, for example, Mirrokni and Nazerzadeh (2017)).
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buyer or decrease the price for the low type. Yet, either change would lead the high type to mimic the
low type. A more promising option is to lower the allocation for (some) low type buyers, and at the
same time reduce the price of the low type. This allows the seller to serve more ex post values of the
low type, and at the same time deter the high types from taking the low types’ contract. Now, the
profit-to-rent condition establishes exactly when this pricing deviation is not profitable for the seller.
The profit-to-rent condition is hence necessary for the optimality of the static contract. Notably, we
also show that it is sufficient. The profit-to-rent condition is a weighted monotonicity condition of the
virtual value around the optimal static threshold. In the case of exponentially distributed values, we
can show that the static contract is optimal if and only if the means of the distributions of the low and
high type are sufficiently close.
In line with the above intuition, we find in Theorem 2 that the optimal sequential contract provides a
lower quantity to the low type, or equivalently randomizes the allocation of the object between 0 and 1,
and assigns a deterministic allocation of 1 to the high type. Randomization is needed to deter the high
type buyer from taking the low type’s contract. More specifically, the optimal contract is characterized
by an allocation probability x ∈ (0, 1), and three thresholds θ1, θ2, and θH with θ1 ≤ θH ≤ θ2. In this
contract, the seller allocates the object to a low type buyer with probability x whenever her value is
between θ1 and θ2, and asks for a payment of θ1 · x. When the true value of the low type is above θ2,
then the object is always allocated to her and the seller demands a payment of θ2 − (θ2 − θ1) · x. The
high type buyer gets the object with certainty and only when her value is above θH , at which point the
payment she has to make to the seller is θH . These parameters are set in such a way that the interim
incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied.
A salient feature of this type of contract is that it discriminates the low type in two dimensions.
First, we establish that θ1 is above the threshold a seller would set if she was selling exclusively to low
type buyers. That is, the low type buyer is being allocated the object less often in the presence of
high type buyers. The opposite holds for high type buyers, they are being allocated the object more
often than if they were alone. Second, there is a range of values for which the object is sold to the
low type with some probability strictly below one, which further reduces the chances of a low type to
receive the object compared to a case in which there are no high type buyers. We illustrate these results
with the example of the exponential distribution for which we have explicit solutions. We find that
for exponential values the sequential contract can exhibit revenue improvements exceeding 40% with
respect to the static contract.
Towards the end of the paper, we consider the case of many interim types. Theorem 3 generalizes
the profit-to-rent condition to a setting with an arbitrary number of interim types. We also explore the
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structure of the optimal sequential contract and the challenges that arise in this setting.
1.3 Related Work
Our model builds on the sequential screening literature as pioneered by Courty and Li (2000), with an
interim participation constraint.2 In contrast, in this paper we impose an ex-post participation constraint.
The closest paper to ours that studies sequential screening with ex-post participation constraints is
Krähmer and Strausz (2015). They establish that the static contract is optimal under a monotonicity
condition regarding the cross-hazard rate functions. This condition rules out some common distributions
for values such as the exponential distribution. Furthermore, the condition is only sufficient, and
therefore, does not provide a complete characterization of when the static contract is optimal. We close
this gap by providing a necessary and sufficient condition under which the static contract is optimal.
Our condition leverages the economic intuition that lies behind a potential profitable deviation from
the optimal static contract. Further and importantly, when the condition fails we characterize the
optimal sequential mechanism and show that randomization of one of the interim types is required for
optimality.3
In terms of approaches, Krähmer and Strausz (2015) relax both the local incentive constraint of the
low type and the monotonicity constraint. Then they show that, under these conditions, the contract
that maximizes the Lagrangian is deterministic and that as a result the static contract is optimal. In
contrast, we also relax the local incentive constraint but maintain the monotonicity constraint. For
the relaxed problem, we perform a first-principle analysis, in the style of Samuelson (1984) and Fuchs
and Skrzypacz (2015) that leads us to identify the structure of the optimal contract. In turn, this
permits us to characterize the optimal sequential contract when the static condition fails. In recent
work, Heumann (2019) considers a setting in which a seller can design the screening mechanism as well
as the information disclosure mechanism with ex-post participation constraints.
The sequential nature of our model and the presence of ex-post participation constraints is related to
the work of Ashlagi, Daskalakis, and Haghpanah (2016) and Balseiro, Mirrokni, and Paes Leme (2018).
These authors consider a model in which a seller, constrained by ex-post participation (also motivated by
2See Akan, Ata, and Dana (2015) for a recent adaptation of the Courty and Li (2000) formulation to study advanced
purchase contracts in revenue management settings.
3See also Manelli and Vincent (2007) and Daskalakis, Deckelbaum, and Tzamos (2015) for examples of multi-good
environments in which stochastic allocations can improve over deterministic ones. In a separate contribution, Krähmer
and Strausz (2016) establish that with multiple units, as opposed to a single unit, generically, the static contract is not
optimal for the sequential screening problem with ex-post participation constraints.
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the display advertising market), repeatedly sells objects to a buyer whose values are independent across
periods. Both papers provide characterizations for a nearly optimal mechanism. They are different
from ours because we consider a single sale and construct the exact optimal mechanism in a sequential
screening model.
Our optimal mechanism is related to the BIN-TAC auction derived in the context of online display
advertising by Celis, Lewis, Mobius, and Nazerzadeh (2014). This is a static auction that offers two
options to advertisers: a buy-it-now (BIN) option in which buyers can purchase the impression at a
posted high price, and a take-a-chance (TAC) option in which the highest bidders are randomly allocated
the impression (if no bidder went for the BIN). This auction is tailored to approximate ironing in the
classic static Myerson setting for non-regular distributions that commonly arise in display advertising
settings. This mechanism is similar in spirit to ours as it randomizes low value buyers to separate
them from high values ones. However, with one bidder the BIN-TAC auction reduces to a posted price
which corresponds to the static contract in our setting. In contrast to their static setting, we study




We consider a seller (he) who is selling one unit of an object at zero cost to a buyer (she) with an
outside option of zero value. Both parties are risk-neutral and have quasilinear utility functions. The
sequence of events unfolds in two periods.
In the first period, the buyer privately learns her interim type (or simply type) and then the parties
contract. The type provides information about the distribution of the ex-post values (or simply value)
of the buyer— her true willingness-to-pay for the object. The contract specifies allocation and payment
as a function of reported interim type and ex-post value. In the second period, the buyer privately
learns her value, and allocations and transfers are realized.
There are finitely many types, denoted k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, and the prior probability of type k is given
by αk with αk > 0 and
∑K
k=1 αk = 1. In the second period, a buyer of type k privately learns her value θ
which we assume to have a continuously differentiable distribution function Fk(θ) and associated density
function fk(θ), with full support in Θ ⊆ [0,∞]. We assume that Θ is a connected interval of the form
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[0, θ]. It will be convenient to denote the upper cumulative distribution function by:
F k(θ) , 1− Fk(θ).
All the distributions are common knowledge. The virtual value of interim type k is given by:
µk(θ) , θ −
1− Fk(θ)
fk(θ)
, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, ∀θ ∈ Θ.
For the rest of the paper we make the standard assumption that the hazard rate:
fk(θ)
1− Fk(θ)
, is increasing in θ,∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. (IHR)
This assumption facilitates our discussion. However, for our formal results we will only need a weaker
assumption that we introduce later.
The terms of trade are specified in the first period by the seller. For a payment t ∈ R and a
probability of receiving the object x ∈ [0, 1], a buyer with value θ receives a utility of θ ·x− t, while the
seller gets paid t.
We assume that the buyer agrees to purchase the object only if she is guaranteed a non-negative net
utility for any possible value of the object she might have. That is, we require θ ·x−t to be non-negative
for all θ. The seller’s problem is to design a contract that maximizes his expected payment, satisfying
the ex-post participation constraint together with incentive compatibility.
2.2 Direct Mechanism
By means of the revelation principle (see, e.g., Myerson (1979)) we can focus on incentive compatible
direct revelation mechanisms, with allocations xk : Θ → [0, 1] and transfers tk : Θ → R, that depend
on reported interim type k′ and ex-post value θ′. Then, for a buyer reporting an interim type k′ and
an ex-post type θ′ the mechanism allocates the object with probability xk′(θ
′) and charges the buyer
tk′(θ
′).
We define the ex-post utility of a buyer who truthfully reported k in the first period and θ′ in the
second period while her true value is θ as
uk(θ; θ
′) , θ · xk(θ′)− tk(θ′),
with the understanding that uk(θ) , uk(θ; θ). Similarly, we define the interim expected utility of a






{uk′(z; θ′)} · fk(z)dz,
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where the maximum is included because double deviations are feasible.
There are two kinds of incentive compatibility constraints that must be satisfied by our mechanism.
The first is the ex-post incentive compatibility constraint (ICxp) which requires that for any report in
the first period, truth-telling is optimal in the second period:
uk(θ) ≥ uk(θ; θ′) ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, ∀θ ∈ Θ. (ICxp)
The second is the interim incentive compatibility constraint (ICi) which requires that truth-telling is
optimal in the first period:
Ukk ≥ Ukk′ ∀k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. (ICi)
Finally we require the mechanism to satisfy the ex-post individual rationality constraint (IRxp)
uk(θ) ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, ∀θ ∈ Θ. (IRxp)







tk(z) · fk(z)dz (P)
s.t (ICi), (ICxp), (IRxp)
0 ≤ x ≤ 1 ,
where we use boldfaces to denote the vector x = (x1, ..., xK). Observe that (IR
xp) implies interim
individual rationality. In fact, if we were to relax (P) by considering only interim individual rationality
we would be in the setting of Courty and Li (2000) for discrete interim types.
In general, one of two types of contract can arise as an optimal solution to the seller’s problem (P):
static or sequential. A static solution to problem (P) corresponds to the case when the allocations and
transfers (xk, tk) do not depend on the interim type k. In this case we have a single menu (x, t) that
is offered to the buyer and the contract does not screen among interim types. We use (Ps) to denote
the constrained version of (P) to static contracts, which we refer to as the static program. In contrast,
a sequential solution allows for different menus that depend on the interim type k, and each type of
buyer self-selects into one of the menus. The problem (P), referred to as the sequential program, allows
for such solutions.
The main focus of this paper is two-fold. First, to study when the optimal solutions to the static and
sequential programs, (Ps) and (P), coincide. Second, when they do not coincide, we aim to characterize
the optimal solution to (P).
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3 A Classic Example of Sequential Screening
We use the opening example of Courty and Li (2000) to illustrate the power of sequential screening in
the presence of an ex-post participation constraint. We show that a sequential contract outperforms
the static contract.
In the opening example, there are two types of potential buyers, low type and high type. One-third
of potential buyers are low type whose value is uniformly distributed in [1, 2]; two-thirds are high type
buyers with value uniformly distributed in [0, 1]∪ [2, 3].4 Courty and Li (2000) think of the low type as
a leisure traveler and of the high type as a business traveler with the same mean but larger variance in
her value. The seller has a production cost equal to 1.
The optimal static contract sets the optimal monopoly price, p̂, equal to 2, which yields a profit of
1/3. The static contract only serves high types who have high realized values. Courty and Li (2000)
show that the seller can significantly increase his profits with sequential screening by offering a menu
of advanced payments/partial refund contracts subject to the weaker interim participation constraints.
The optimal contract offers an advanced payment of 1.5 and no refund to the leisure traveler, and an
advanced payment of 1.75 and a partial refund of 1 to the business traveler. Notice that in this contract
some buyers will experience a realized negative net utility. For example, the leisure traveler initially
pays 1.5 but her actual value can be any value within [1, 2] and, therefore, half of the time she will
obtain negative net utility after learning her value. Because of the advanced payment, the contract does
not satisfy the ex-post participation constraint.
By contrast, the following version of a sequential contract does satisfy the ex-post participation
constraints. The seller offers a menu of two quantities and prices, (xL, pL) and (xH , pH). The high item
is set equal to the optimal static contract, that is (xH , pH) = (1, 2). Thus, the selling price for the high
type is 2 and high types that buy receive the full quantity. Next, we determine the optimal quantity
and price for the low type buyer. Given the contract for the high type, the seller’s profit is given by:
1
3






where xL ∈ [0, 1] and pL ∈ [1, 2]. We need to ensure that the menu is interim incentive compatible.
The incentive constraint of the low type is always satisfied (pH equals 2), and incentive constraint of
















4We note that the opening example of Courty and Li (2000) violates the common support assumption made earlier in
Section 2. Yet, the failure of the common support does not affect our argument.
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/2 which, in turn, delivers a profit of
2/3 − 1/(2
√




From this simple exercise we learn an important lesson: even in this simple setting, a sequential
contract can have substantial benefits over a static contract. In this paper we study more generally
when a sequential contract outperforms a static contract and what drives this revenue improvement.
4 Optimality of Static Contract
In the main result of this section, Theorem 1, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for
the static contract to be optimal. We begin with a reformulation of the problem based on standard
techniques that use the envelope theorem, and enables us to solve for the allocation and utilities of the
lowest ex-post types instead of both allocations and transfers. Using the reformulation we characterize
the optimal static contract. In Section 4.2, we use the optimal static contract together with a simple
deviation analysis to obtain an intuitive necessary condition for its optimality. In Section 4.3, we show
that this condition is both necessary and sufficient.
4.1 Problem Reformulation and Static Solution
We obtain a more amenable characterization of the constraints by eliminating the transfers as in the
classical Myersonian analysis.
Lemma 1 (Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Implementation)
The mechanism (x, t) satisfies (ICi),(ICxp) and (IRxp) if and only if
1. xk(·) is a non-decreasing function for all k in {1, . . . ,K} and
uk(θ) = uk(0) +
∫ θ
0
xk(z)dz, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, ∀θ ∈ Θ. (1)
2. uk(0) ≥ 0 for all k in {1, . . . ,K}.
3. uk(0) +
∫
Θ xk(z)F k(z)dz ≥ uk′(0) +
∫
Θ xk′(z)F k(z)dz for all k, k
′ in {1, . . . ,K}.
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All proofs are provided in the Appendix. The first condition in the lemma is the standard envelope
condition and it comes from the ex-post incentive compatibility constraint. The second condition is
derived from the ex-post individual rationality constraint and the fact that uk(θ) is non-decreasing. The
third condition is the envelope formula inserted into the interim incentive compatibility constraint. We
should also note that with distributions with common support and under ex-post incentive compatibility,
the maximum in the interim incentive compatibility constraint will always be achieved at θ′ equal to z;
hence, we can restrict attention to single deviations.
Lemma 1 enables us to obtain a more compact formulation for the seller’s problem. Specifically,
we can use equation (1) and integration by parts to write down the objective of (P) in terms of the
allocation rule x and the indirect utilities {uk(0)}Kk=1 of the lowest ex-post types. To this end, we denote













s.t xk(θ) non-decreasing, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}




xk(z)F k(z)dz ≥ uk′ +
∫
Θ
xk′(z)F k(z)dz, ∀k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,K},
Note that in (P) the variables are the allocation rule x and the vector of the indirect utilities of the
lowest ex-post types u. Once we solve for these variables the transfers are determined by equation (1).
As we mentioned before, a solution to (P) that screens the interim types is a sequential contract.
In contrast, a static solution to (P) pools the interim types. Formally, we say that a solution to (P) or
contract is static when xk(·) , x(·) and uk , u for all k in {1, . . . ,K}.
We earlier defined the virtual value µk(·) of interim type k. Given (IHR) the virtual value for each
type k has exactly one zero which we denote by θ̂k. Without loss of generality we assume for the
remainder of the paper that we have ordered the interim types so that:
θ̂1 ≤ · · · ≤ θ̂K .
It turns out that solving (P) over the space of static contracts is a simpler problem. The (ICxi)
constraints disappear from the problem because in this case there is effectively only one interim type.
Also, it is clear that any optimal solution sets uk = 0 for all k in {1, . . . ,K}. So, the static version of
11












where a simple calculation shows that the term in parenthesis is equal to the virtual value function of
the mixture distribution times the density function of the mixture. Hence, this problem corresponds to
the classic optimal monopoly price problem applied to the mixture distribution over types. The relevant









is always given by a threshold value θ̂, that can be implemented by a single posted price p̂ = θ̂.
Lemma 2 (Threshold Allocation)
A solution to (Ps) is a threshold value characterized by θ̂ ∈ [θ̂1, θ̂K ] that maximizes (2).
4.2 A Necessary Condition
In the remainder of this and the next Section we state the results for the setting with binary interim
types. We denote the low type by L and the high type by H. In Section 6 we return to the general
setting with finitely many interim types.
The static optimal solution is characterized by a threshold value θ̂. In this section, we leverage
this characterization, and perform an analysis in the style of Bulow and Roberts (1989), to deduce an
intuitive necessary condition for the optimality of the static contract. As we will show later in Section
4.3 this condition turns out to be not only necessary but also sufficient.






, ∀θ ∈ Θ. (3)








Figure 1: Weighted virtual valuations for low type (dotted line) and high type (dashed line) buyer
around θ̂. The shaded areas correspond to the virtual revenue that the seller misses when using a static
contract with respect to the case in which the interim types are public information.
Suppose now that a static contract is optimal, that is, setting a single posted price equal to θ̂ for both
types solves (P). Consider Figure 1, where we have plotted the virtual value weighted by the density
function for each type.5 If the types were public information, the seller would optimally set posted prices
equal to θ̂L and θ̂H for types L and H, respectively. In this way, the seller would serve buyers if and only
if they have positive virtual values. In contrast, when selecting a single posted price θ̂, there is surplus
that the seller is not extracting; the shaded area shows the regions of the virtual values for each type
that the static contract is not capturing. For the high type, the static contract serves too many buyers,
some of them with negative virtual values; hence, the seller would be better off by offering a higher
price. For the low type, the static contract serves too few buyers, leaving positive virtual value buyers
unserved; hence, the seller would prefer to choose a lower price. A challenge, though, is that the seller
faces incentive compatibility constraints that restrict this type of possible deviations/improvements:
1. Selling to fewer high types implies increasing the price for high types; but then the high types
have an incentive to accept the low type contract and such a deviation is not feasible.
2. Selling to more low types amounts to reducing the price from θ̂ to some value θ1. However, to
prevent the high types from taking the low type contract the seller must decrease the quantity
offered to the low types (or equivalently, randomize their allocation).













Figure 2: Weighted virtual valuations for low type (dotted line) and high type (dashed line) buyer
around θ̂. The shaded areas correspond to the virtual revenue that the seller leaves on the table when
using a static contract with respect to the case in which the interim types are public information. We
display the deviation from the static contract for the low type (solid line). If the solid areas A and B
are such that A−B ≥ 0, the deviation is profitable.
This second improvement is feasible by choosing a quantity (probability) 0 < xL < 1 to all low types
inside an interval [θ1, θ2] with θ1 ≤ θ̂ ≤ θ2, see Figure 2.
Formally, these allocations correspond to the following menu:
xL(θ) ,

0 if θ < θ1,
xL if θ1 ≤ θ ≤ θ2,
1 if θ2 < θ;
xH(θ) ,
0 if θ < θ̂,1 if θ̂ ≤ θ; (4)
with uL = uH = 0. We refer to this deviation as an interior variation or improvement.
The interior improvement is feasible only if it satisfies both incentive compatibility constraints.











and for the high type:
∫ θ
θ̂




















which contains both incentive compatibility constraints. The monotone hazard rate condition (3) guar-
antees that xL as in given by (5) always exists. The interior variation is thus feasible and we can select
xL so as to maximize the seller’s revenue.








and since µL(θ) ≥ 0 in [θ1, θ2] (see Figure 2) the right hand side inequality in (5) must be tight.
With the interior variation, the seller serves more low-value buyers in [θ1, θ̂] at the level of xL. This
comes at the expense of offering a lower quantity, a loss of 1 − xL to buyers with values in [θ̂, θ2]. In
Figure 2 the area A corresponds to the additional revenue the seller can make due to the variation
because he is serving more low type buyers, and region B is the efficiency loss due to the incentive
constraints.
If the static contract is optimal then this variation cannot be profitable. In terms of Figure 2 this
means the areas must satisfy A ≤ B. Hence, if the static contract is optimal then
A = xL ·
∫ θ̂
θ1




In turn, since the optimal choice of xL always equals the right hand side of (5), we can insert xL in












To better understand this inequality consider a seller who faces a buyer with values distributed according
to Fk(·). Observe that at any given price θb the expected profit Πk(θb) of the seller and the expected
informational rent Ik(θb) of the buyer are given by:
Πk(θb) , θb · (1− Fk(θb)) =
∫ θ
θb




If the monopolist considers lowering the price from θb to θa then the change in profit is Πk(θa)−Πk(θb).




then is a measure of the average impact in profits per unit of consumer rents the seller experiences due
to the price variation.
Now condition (6) can be rewritten to obtain a version of this ratio across different interim types.
To this end, we set k = L in the numerator and k = H in the denominator. This suggests the following:
Definition 1 (Average Profit-to-Rent Ratio)










, ∀j, k ∈ {L,H}, 0 ≤ θa ≤ θb ≤ θ.
The average profit-to-rent ratio measures the changes in the seller’s profit in terms of the information
rents he gives away to the consumer due to a change in price. The ratio Rjk compares the impact on
profit from type j with the increase in the information rent to type k. This cross ratio arises as the
incentive compatibility constraint for type k implies that a modification in the contract for type j affects
type k as well. This was clear from our discussion regarding the interior variation above. There, a price
θ1 (smaller than θ̂) for type L creates a profit improvement for the seller measured by the numerator
of R. Since the seller has to make sure that type H does not take the type L contract (by reducing
quantity), this price decrease generates a loss to the seller quantified by the denominator of R.
Back to (6) we notice that the numerator in either ratio refers to the revenue that the seller is
making from the low type over some interval, and the denominator refers to the information rent of the
high type over the same interval. Now, since the choice of θ1, θ2 was arbitrary, we obtain the following
necessary condition by taking minimum and maximum at both sides of the inequality in (6). If the
static contract is optimal then
max
θ1≤θ̂
RLH(θ1, θ̂) ≤ min
θ̂≤θ2
RLH(θ̂, θ2), (7)
The above condition establishes that if the static contract is optimal then any extra revenue the
seller can garner from low type buyers is offset by the efficiency loss due to the incentive compatibility
constraints: A−B ≤ 0 for any possible choice of θ1 and θ2.
4.3 A Necessary and Sufficient Condition
We now establish that condition (7) is in fact a sufficient condition for the optimal static solution
to coincide with the optimal solution to (P). Before we provide the main theorem, we introduce some
notation for the quantities of interest that will help us to further refine our intuition. While we maintain
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the binary type framework here; we note that all definitions naturally extend to finitely many types as
we will see in Section 6.
The local version of the average profit-to-rent ratio, when θa < θ̂ < θb are close to θ̂, gives rise to
the profit-to-rent ratio.
Definition 2 (Profit-to-Rent Ratio)




, ∀j, k ∈ {L,H},∀θ ∈ Θ.
The ratio rjk(θb) is obtained as limθa↑θb R
jk(θa, θb). Observe that condition (IHR) implies that r
kk(θ)
is non-decreasing for each k ∈ {L,H}. The latter is the condition we use for our formal results.
Now, we are ready to state and discuss the main result of this section.
Theorem 1 (Optimality of Static Contract)
Suppose rkk(θ) is non-decreasing for each k ∈ {L,H}. The static contract is optimal if and only if
max
θ≤θ̂
RLH(θ, θ̂) ≤ min
θ̂≤θ
RLH(θ̂, θ). (APR)
This results complements the necessary condition given in Section 4.2 by showing that it is also
sufficient. We showed in Section 4.2 that condition (APR) established that the specific deviation that
increases the sales to the lower type with a lower quantity is not profitable relative to the static contract.
Theorem 1 now establishes that in fact this is not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition.
The sufficiency condition is noteworthy as it arises from “simple” deviations, namely, those that assign
the low type an interior allocation in a small interval around the static optimal price. In particular,
we do not need to be concerned with either more elaborate deviations which offer the low type several
options in his menu nor do we need to trace simultaneous changes to the offers to the high type. The
present theorem confirms that this type of interior improvement for the low type is sufficient to study
changes in the seller’s revenue. In Section 5 we establish that the family of allocations suggested by the
interior variation completely describes the optimal sequential mechanism as well.
To prove the sufficiency in Theorem 1 we rely a on dualization-type of argument. For the necessity,
we assume that condition (APR) is not satisfied and show that in that case there is a profitable deviation
as given by the following proposition.
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Proposition 1 (Revenue Improvement)
Suppose rLL(θ) is non-decreasing. Assume condition (APR) does not hold. Then there exists θ1, θ2 such
that θ1 < θ̂ < θ2 and R
LH(θ1, θ̂) > R








yields a strict improvement in (P) over the static contract.
In the proof of Proposition 1 we see that as soon as condition (APR) fails, two things happen. First,
a non-static contract becomes feasible which does not violate the incentive constraints. The mere fact
that (APR) fails implies the feasibility of the new allocation. Second, the sequential contract guarantees
a larger expected revenue than the static one.
4.4 The Exponential Example
Before we establish the optimal sequential contract it might be helpful to build some intuition for the
above results. We shall consider the case of exponentially distributed values. The main result of this
section establishes that the static contract is optimal if and only if the mean of the interim types are
sufficiently close.
We consider the exponential density functions
fk(θ) = λke
−λkθ, k = {L,H} θ ≥ 0.
We assume λL > λH , so L and H stand for low and high type respectively. Note that H has a higher
mean (1/λH) than L (1/λL) and that H dominates L in the sense of the hazard rate stochastic order
and in first order stochastic dominance. In addition, for the interim probabilities we have αL +αH = 1
with αL, αH > 0.
We begin by studying the optimal solution to the static formulation. The optimal static contract
is given by a threshold allocation. Thus, in the exponential case the seller’s expected revenue for any




(αLµL(z)fL(z) + αHµH(z)fH(z))dz = αLθe
−λLθ + αHθe
−λHθ.










−λHθ = 0, (8)
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that is, the optimal threshold is a zero of the mixture virtual value. Notice that equation (8) cannot
be explicitly solved; however, we can (as we do in the forthcoming results) provide comparative statics.
Interestingly, in Proposition 4 below, we show that we can obtain explicit expressions for the thresholds
characterizing the optimal sequential contract. The following lemma provides some initial properties of
the optimal static contract.
Lemma 3
The optimal solution to (Ps) is a threshold allocation characterized by θ̂ in [ 1λL ,
1
λH
], solving (8). Also,
θ̂ is a non-increasing function of αL with θ̂(0) =
1
λH
and θ̂(1) = 1λL .
Next, we state a necessary and sufficient condition for the static contract to be optimal.
Proposition 2 (Necessity and Sufficiency for the Exponential Model)
The static contract is optimal if and only if




The result follows from Theorem 1. We note that the threshold value θ̂ in the inequality is a solution
to equation (8) and, therefore, it depends on the parameters λL and λH . Subsequent corollaries provide
sharper characterizations that only depend on the model primitives. We highlight that (9) corresponds
to a particular case of condition (APR).
Proposition 2 provides an intuitive characterization for when the seller is better-off screening the
interim types than not. In terms of equation (9), when λL and λH are sufficiently close, then equation
(9) should hold, in which case the static contract is optimal. Conversely, when λL and λH are sufficiently
distant, then the static contract will not be optimal.
Intuitively, when the interim types are similar any contract that screens the types would be close in
terms of expected revenue to the static contract because for each type it could get at most what it would
get by setting thresholds 1/λL and 1/λH respectively, but θ̂ ∈ [ 1λL ,
1
λH
]. However, when screening, the
seller has to pay an extra cost to prevent the types from mimicking each other and, since the contracts’
revenue will be similar, it is likely that this cost offsets the earnings from screening. On the other hand,
when interim types are sufficiently apart in their mean value then the seller can tailor the contract to
each type and in this way extract more from them than in the static contract.
Corollary 1 (Optimality of Static Contract)
If λL ∈ (λH , 2λH ], then for any αL ∈ [0, 1] the static contract is optimal.
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This result establishes that when the distributions of the low and high type buyers are sufficiently
close to each other then no matter in which proportion the types are, the static contract is always
optimal.
Corollary 2 (Comparative Statics in αL)
If λL > 2λH , then there exists ᾱ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all αL ∈ (0, ᾱ) the sequential contract is strictly
optimal and for all αL ∈ [ᾱ, 1] the static contract is optimal.
Corollary 2 asserts that when the mean of low and high types are sufficiently distinct, then the
optimality of the static vs. the sequential contract is determined by the frequency of each type. If the
proportion of low types is sufficiently low (but not zero), then the seller is better-off screening the types.
On the other hand, if there is a large proportion of low types then the static contract is optimal. This
follows as the threshold value θ̂ decreases as αL increases.
Corollary 3 (Comparative Statics in λL)
For fixed λH and αH , there exists λ̄L such that for all λL ∈ (λ̄L,∞) the sequential contract is strictly
optimal.
4.5 Discussion





Krähmer and Strausz (2015) introduced an expanded monotonicity condition that relates any pair of




are increasing in θ, ∀j, k ∈ {L,H}. (R)
They show that under condition (R) the optimal solution to (P) and to (Ps) coincide, thus the static
contract is optimal. In fact, they show this result for multiple interim types. We discuss our general-
ization of condition (APR) to multiple types in Section 6. However, condition (R) is rather restrictive
and is not satisfied by some common distributions. For example, the condition is not satisfied by any
pair of exponential distributions, because in this case the cross-hazard rate is given by:
hjk(θ) = λje
−(λj−λk)θ, j, k = L,H.
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Outside this set the static contract
Figure 3: Optimality of the static contract for (IHR) distributions, with K = 2 and a single buyer.
If, without loss of generality, we consider λL > λH then h
LH(θ) is a decreasing function and, therefore,
it violates conditions (R). However, notice (IHR) is satisfied because the simple hazard rate functions
are constant and equal to 1/λk.
We can also compare Theorem 1 with Lemma 12 in Krähmer and Strausz (2014). In that Lemma
they assume hHH(θ) < hLL(θ), which implies θ̂L < θ̂H , and establish that a necessary condition for
the static contract to be optimal is to have the profit-to-rent ratio rLH(θ) being increasing at θ̂. Our
result contains this lemma, because if rLH(·) were decreasing at θ̂, then we could always find θ1 < θ̂
and θ2 > θ̂ such that
RLH(θ1, θ̂) > R
LH(θ̂, θ2).
Thus (APR) does not hold and, therefore, the static contract would not be optimal. Figure 3 illustrates
how our condition (APR) closes the gap between the ones offered by Krähmer and Strausz (2015).
We can compare condition (R) and (APR). Note that condition (R) implies the monotonicity of the













≥ rLH(θ̂), ∀θ ≥ θ̂.
Hence, the result by Krähmer and Strausz (2015) that if condition (R) holds then the static contract
is optimal follows as a corollary of Theorem 1. We highlight that while condition (R) implies that the
profit-to-rent ratios are increasing, our condition (APR) only implies the monotonicity of an appropriate
weighted average of the profit-to-rent ratios. This is sensible as we are dealing with interim expected
seller’s revenues and interim incentive compatibility constraints.
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In terms of methodology, our approach differs from that of Krähmer and Strausz (2015). Their
approach consists of relaxing the low to high interim incentive constraint and then – by using their
condition (R) – they relax the monotonicity constraint and prove that the solution must be a threshold
schedule for each type. From there, they show that the threshold for both types must be equal and,
therefore, the static contract is optimal.
In our approach we do not use a relaxation of the general formulation nor do we impose conditions
on the primitives besides that rkk(θ) are non-decreasing. For the sufficiency we construct a Lagrangian
relaxation with multipliers for the incentive compatibility constraints, but we do not relax the mono-
tonicity constraints. The multipliers relate to the profit-to-rent ratios at the static threshold θ̂; they
measure the change in the objective per unit of change in the constraints. Then by leveraging the result
of Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) that an optimal contract is a threshold allocation we prove that under
(APR) the solution to the relaxation is the static contract.
5 Sequential Contracts
We now proceed to provide the complete characterization of the optimal sequential contract when the
necessary and sufficient condition associated with the static contract fails. As hinted in Section 4.2 and
by Proposition 1 the optimal sequential contract gives a deterministic allocation to the high type and,
for mid-range values, it randomizes the low type buyer (or equivalently reduces the quantity allocated).
5.1 The Structure of the Sequential Contract













s.t xk(θ) non-decreasing, ∀k ∈ {L,H}








The difference between (PR) and the original problem (P) is the omission of the incentive constraint
for the low type to report truthfully. Importantly, we do not relax the monotonicity constraint. We
obtain a characterization of the optimal solution to (PR) as stated by the following theorem.
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Proposition 3 (Relaxed Solution)
Suppose rkk(θ) is non-decreasing for each k ∈ {L,H}. The optimal solution of (PR) has allocations
x?L(θ) ,

0 if θ < θ1,
xL if θ1 ≤ θ ≤ θ2,
1 if θ2 < θ;
x?H(θ) ,
0 if θ < θH ,1 if θH ≤ θ.








Note that if θ1 = θH then we would recover the static contract. Importantly, the optimal contract of
(PR) has the same structure as the profitable deviation to the static contract presented in Proposition
1. The only difference is that in the former the threshold for the high type may not necessarily be equal
to θ̂ as in the latter. With this generalization one can show that the proposed profitable deviation is
indeed optimal for (PR). The associated transfers are given by:
t?L(θ) =

0 if θ < θ1,
θ1 · xL if θ1 ≤ θ ≤ θ2,
θ2 − (θ2 − θ1) · xL if θ2 < θ;
t?H(θ) =
0 if θ < θH ,θH if θH ≤ θ.
We use an improvement argument to show that the optimal contract of (PR) only requires a simple
threshold allocation without randomization for the high type. We use a second improvement argument
to show that the low type allocation only requires a single interval of randomization.
More specifically, consider a low type allocation that randomizes between an interval [θa, θb]. Recall
the argument in Section 4.3 where we found a revenue improvement while keeping feasibility, in par-
ticular, while maintaining the incentive constraint of the high type. Using a similar reasoning, we can
















= RLH(θ̃, θb). (10)
In general this condition is not satisfied, because the profit-to-rent ratio rLH(·) does not need to be a
non-decreasing function. Therefore, we cannot find a feasible improvement over the random allocation
contract, and hence, we cannot restrict attention to deterministic contracts for the low type. In contrast,
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a similar argument for the high type yields the expression RHH(θa, θ̃) ≤ RHH(θ̃, θb), which always holds
when rHH(·) is non-decreasing. Hence, we can restrict attention to a deterministic threshold contract
for the high type.
In addition, the low type allocation only requires a single interval of randomization. To see this,
suppose for example that x?L(θ) equals xa in (θa, θ̃) and xb in (θ̃, θb) with 0 < xa < xb < 1 , and
also assume (10) does not hold. Then, it is possible to show that we can increase xa and decrease xb
(maintaining feasibility) and obtain an improvement to the objective function. We can do this until xa
and xb collapse into a single value.
The discussion above highlights again the importance of the average profit-to-rent ratios in our
analysis, as they quantify revenue improvements while maintaining incentive compatibility. We can
now characterize the optimal sequential contract.
Theorem 2 (Optimal Sequential Contract)
Suppose rkk(θ) is non-decreasing for each k ∈ {L,H}. The optimal sequential contract coincides with
the optimal solution of (PR) as given by Proposition 3.
In Proposition 3 we provided the characterization of the optimal solution to (PR). In the proof of
Theorem 2 we argue that the optimal solution to (PR) is feasible for (P) and thus optimal. In turn, we
obtain a full characterization of the optimal sequential contract in terms of three parameters ((θ1, θ2, θH)
that we characterize in Lemma B-1 in the appendix ).
The sequential contract makes the low type worse-off and the high type better-off with respect to
the contract the seller would offer if he could perfectly screen each type. For the low type, that contract
would set a threshold equal to θ̂L and would always allocate the object when her value is above the
threshold. However, the sequential contract allocates the object to the low type whenever her value is
above θ1 ≥ θ̂L with positive probability. So the low type is worse-off in two dimensions: she is allocated
the object less often and with less probability. On the other hand, the high type receives the object
more often and with certainty since θH ≤ θ̂H .
5.2 The Exponential Example Continued
In Section 4.4 we studied the properties and structure of the optimal static contract for exponential
values. We now derive the optimal sequential contract for this environment.
Proposition 4 (Optimal Sequential Contract for Exponential Distributions)
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If condition (9) fails, then the optimal allocation is
x?L(θ) =
0 if θ < θ1,x if θ1 ≤ θ; and x?H(θ) =
0 if θ < θH ,1 if θH ≤ θ.


























This result follows from Theorem 2. We note that in the exponential case we only have two intervals
for the low type’s allocation and thus θ2 =∞. Thus, the low type is uniformly restricted to a quantity
below one for all realized values θ ≥ θ1.
We now illustrate our findings below and vary the difference in the mean between low and high
type. Specifically, we fix αL to be 0.7 and λH to be 0.5, that is, the high type has mean 2. Since we are
assuming λL > λH , we consider λL = λH + δ with δ > 0. Figure 4 shows how the different thresholds
vary as δ increases or, equivalently, as the mean of the low type decreases to zero. As we can see, there
is a value of δ (δ =0.93) to the left of which the static contract is optimal and to its right the sequential
contract is optimal. As suggested by Proposition 2, as δ increases, (λL − λH) increases, and therefore,
we expect it to be larger than 1/θ̂ (see Corollary 2 and Corollary 3). As δ increases, the two distribution
become more distant from each other and there is gain in screening the types.
In terms of thresholds, we observe that for the static contract, θ̂ is decreasing initially and then it
increases getting closer to 1/λH = 2. This happens because as we increase δ we are making 1/λL smaller.
However, at some point this value becomes too small and, therefore, the probability of allocating the
object to a low type, P (value low type > θ̂) = e−λLθ̂, is going to be so low that the seller will be better
off by choosing a threshold tailored for the high type, that is, close to 1/λH = 2. For the sequential
thresholds, the one for the low type is decreasing while the one for the high type is increasing in δ. As
δ increases the distributions become more different and, therefore, it is optimal to set thresholds closer
and closer to the threshold a seller would set if he knew the types in advance, that is, 1/λL and 1/λH .
We can also compare the different mechanisms in terms of the resulting revenue. The optimal
revenue for the sequential contract Πseq is given by:
Πseq = αL · x · θ1 · e−λLθ1 + αH · θH · e−λHθH .
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Figure 4: Optimal thresholds for static and sequential contracts when setting λL = λH+δ, with αL = 0.7
and λH = 0.5.
Then, we can plot the different revenues as we vary δ. Figure 5 (left panel and thick line in right panel)
depicts the results. When αL is large, the static threshold θ̂ is tailored to the low types and so (9) holds
for more values of λL. As screening occurs when the mean of the low type is sufficiently small, and
thus δ is large, the revenue improvement due to sequential contracts become more significant, e.g., 35%






















Figure 5: Left: Optimal expected revenue for static and sequential. Right: Percentage improvement of
the sequential over the static contract. In both figures we set set λL = λH + δ with λH = 0.5. In the
left figure we set αL = 0.7 while in the right figure αL takes values in {0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 0.95}.
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5.3 Menu Implementation
Next, we discuss how the optimal sequential contract can be implemented in practice. By means of the
taxation principle we can verify that the following menu of contracts is an indirect implementation of
our optimal mechanism:
• contract H: there is a single posted price of pH = θH ;
• contract L: the buyer can choose between two items:
(a) buy at a price of pL = θ1 · xL and be allocated with probability xL.
(b) buy at a price of pL = θ2 − (θ2 − θ1) · xL and be allocated with probability 1.
The prices in the above menu of contracts are set using the values in Proposition 3. This imple-
mentation offers a posted price to the high type buyer, and gives to the low type buyer two options.
In option (a) the low type buyer can pay a low price but it can potentially not acquire the item or
equivalently, get a reduced quantity; in (b), the low type buyer pays a high price and always gets the
object.
An appealing feature of the implementation is that if we think of allocations as quantities, then we
can order the per unit prices. In contract L, the per unit prices are θ1 and θ1 · xL + θ2 · (1− xL) for (a)
and (b), respectively. Hence, the per unit price in (a) is less than or equal to the one in (b). That is,
the low type in (a) receives less of the good but at a discounted price compare to the low type in (b).
For contract H, the per unit price is θH and, since θ1 is less than or equal to θH , the low type in (a)
receives less of the good at a discounted price compared to the high type buyer as well.
6 Multiple Types
Until now, we have studied the optimality of the static and sequential contract for two interim types of
the buyer. In this section, we extend the analysis to an arbitrary number of interim types {1, . . . ,K}
and investigate some properties of the solution to (P). In particular, we provide a generalized version
of condition (APR). Then, we provide numerical evidence and highlight the challenges associated with
the characterization of the optimal sequential mechanism when K > 2.
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6.1 A Necessary and Sufficient Condition
Our generalized necessary and sufficient condition continues to rely on small variations in the objective
around the static solution. To this end, we consider the following set:
A ,
{
(λij)i,j∈{1,··· ,K}2 ≥ 0 :
∑
j 6=k










λjk, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}
}
.
The set A contains the multipliers associated with the incentive constraints that encode the change
in the objective as we deviate from the optimal static allocation. Roughly speaking, when the static
contract is optimal, allocation perturbations in the contract of each type should equal the dualized
costs associated to such perturbations in the incentive constraints. In other words, the derivative of the
Lagrangian with respect to the posted price around the static solution equals zero. This is captured
by the set of equalities in the definition of A. In addition, the set of inequalities ensures that the
optimal ex-post utilities of the lowest value buyers are zero. Note that multipliers being in the set A
are necessary for optimality. The next result provides a necessary and sufficient condition.
Theorem 3 (Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Finitely Many Types)
The set A is non-empty. If there exists a feasible solution to (P) which strictly satisfies all the incentive
























for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
The strict feasibility to (P) corresponds to the standard Slater condition. Condition (APRM ) is
obtained by analyzing the Lagrangian when the static contract is optimal and disentangling the key
conditions it must satisfy. We note that this condition is easy to verify– it amounts to minimizing
a convex program. Indeed, both sides in the inequality of (APRM ) correspond to convex (left) and
concave (right) functions of λ. Their difference, left side minus right side, is thus a convex function.
Moreover, because we can always choose θ equal to θ̂ , this difference is always bounded below by zero.
Condition (APRM ) then establishes that we can find λ such that this convex function equals zero, that
is, its minimum value equals zero. This can be readily verified by using, for example, a sub-gradient-type
method.
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To obtain a better understanding of this condition it is helpful to see how it generalizes the necessary
and sufficient condition provided in Theorem 1 for two types. The general condition of Theorem 3 turns




α1 ·R11(θ, θ̂)− λ21 ·
∫ θ̂






α1 ·R11(θ̂, θ)− λ21 ·
∫ θ








α2 ·R22(θ, θ̂)− λ12 ·
∫ θ̂






α2 ·R22(θ̂, θ)− λ12 ·
∫ θ




where λ12 and λ21 belong to A. We next argue that condition (APR) holds if and only if there exist
λ12, λ21 ∈ A such that conditions (12) and (13) hold. Suppose (APR) holds. Since we expect the
incentive constraint of the low type not to be binding we set λ12 equal to zero. Because λ must belong
to A this necessarily implies that λ21 is equal to α1r12(θ̂). For this choice of multipliers, the inequality
(13) follows directly from rkk being increasing. At the same time, the choice of multipliers together
with (APR) imply that both the max and the min in (12) are equal to zero. To see this consider the
maximum in (12) and take θ = θ̂, since λ21 equal to α1r
12(θ̂) the expression inside the brackets is zero.
Hence, the maximum in (12) is bounded below by zero. It is also bounded above by zero,
α1 ·R11(θ, θ̂)− λ21 ·
∫ θ̂
θ F 2(z)dz∫ θ̂
θ F 1(z)dz
≤ 0⇔ R12(θ, θ̂) ≤ r12(θ̂), ∀θ ≤ θ̂.
When (APR) holds the right hand side inequality above always holds. A similar argument applies to the
min. Therefore, the condition provided in Theorem 1 implies APRM for the binary case. The converse
implication follows from a contradiction argument which for the sake of brevity we omit.
The two type case is amenable to this simplification because one can readily solve for the multipliers:
λ12 equal to zero is a natural choice, and λ21 = α1r
12(θ̂) then follows from the definition of A. Unfor-
tunately, when K > 2 the space of deviations is richer and so is the possible selection of multipliers. In
turn this precludes a transparent characterization as in the two type case.
An appealing feature of (APRM ) is that it provides a practical, simple way to verify that for a range
of distributions the static contract is optimal as shown in the following result.
Proposition 5 (Alternative Sufficient Conditions)
Under the Slater condition of Theorem 3 and either
(i) condition (R), or
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(ii) z · fk(z) is non-decreasing for all k,
the static contract is optimal.
In the proposition above we show that either (i) or (ii) imply condition (APRM ) and, consequently,
the optimality of the static contract (cf. Theorem 3). Roughly speaking, in the proof of the proposition
we show that under (i) or (ii), for all types, an appropriate function is non-decreasing. This function
relates to the integrand in the numerator of the expression inside the maximum and minimum in
(APRM ). In turn, by leveraging this monotonicity property we establish that the maximum equals the
minimum in (APRM ).
The conditions in Proposition 5 are very different in nature. Condition (i) is the same property
under which Krähmer and Strausz (2015) prove the optimality of the static contract (here we provide
an alternative proof). This is a “cross” condition in the sense that links the distribution of different
interim types. It is satisfied when the density of each type is increasing, for example, for a natural
families of distributions such as fk(z) = z
βk for some βk > 1 and z ∈ [0, 1]. Condition (ii) does not
associate the distributions of different types—it is not a cross condition. This property is satisfied by
some truncated heavy-tailed distribution; for example, the log-normal distribution truncated between
zero and the exponential of the mean of its logarithmic value.
Theorem 3 provides a simple, easy-to-verify set of inequalities for the optimality of the static con-
tract with multiple-types. By contrast, a complete characterization of the sequential contract seems
substantially more complex with finitely many types. Next, in the context of exponentially distributed
ex-post types, we briefly describe partial results and highlight the challenges associated with multiple
types that already appear in the numerical analysis.
6.2 The Exponential Example Continued
Despite the challenges that we discussed above, we are able to provide the following result for the
exponential environment.
Proposition 6 (Structure of Sequential Contract with Exponential Distributions)
For exponential values the optimal allocations have at most one randomized interval.
Proposition 6 establishes that for exponentially distributed values the optimal contract is simple
in the sense that each interim type’s allocation is randomized at most in one interval. The proof
proceeds by establishing that the monotonicity constraints form a cone, and then using duality and
30
complementary slackness. It is worth mentioning that the proof method applies more generally but the
structure of the contract in general depends on the values of the dual variables corresponding to the
incentive constraints. In the exponential case, the argument can be simplified to show that the simple
structure in the result arises independent of these variables’ values.
The characterization in Proposition 6 only establishes the structure of the optimal allocations but
it does not provide information on the number of contracts that the optimal solutions will ultimately
feature. For example, if K = 4, Proposition 6 does not say whether the optimal solution will pool the
interim types creating either one, two, three or four different contracts. In general, the full range of
contracts from static to fully sequential (K different contracts ) is possible.
To further explore the structure of optimal contracts we provide numerical results. In Figure 6 we
show the optimal allocations when K = 4 and all interim types have exponentially distributed values.
A first observation is that for different proportions αk of interim types the optimal contract can feature
different levels of separation. Panel (a) in the figure corresponds to an optimal static contract (no
separation), and panel (d) in the figure corresponds to an optimal sequential contract that features a
different contract for each interim type (full separation). As a second observation note that out of the
four instances depicted in Figure 6 only one, (d), has four contracts in the optimal solution. Finding the
minimal number of contracts that give a good approximation to the optimal multiple type sequential
contract is a question outside the scope of this paper but that may be of interest to study in the future.
Observe that across the instances in Figure 6 each optimal contract has at most one interval of
value for which randomization occurs (see Proposition 6). This simple structure of the optimal contract
appears however not to be robust to other specifications of the value distributions. When we con-
sider the case of normally distributed values (using truncated normal random variables), the optimal
contract might exhibit several different intervals of randomization for a given type. In general, richer
contract features may arise when we combine exponential, normal, uniform or other distributions. As
a consequence, generally speaking, it is challenging to analytically characterize the optimal solution.
The challenge here is that classic relaxation approaches used in the mechanism design literature do
not apply in our setting. For example, relaxing all the upward incentive constraints and leaving only
the local downward incentive constraints does not work because in general global downward incentive
constraints bind. Moreover, binding constraints are highly sensitive to model primitives. Improving our
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Figure 6: Optimal allocations for K = 4, types have exponential distribution with means (2.2, 5.0, 12, 50)
respectively (for numerical simplicity, we use truncated versions of these distributions in the interval
[0,60]). In each panel the vertical axis corresponds to buyers’ valuations and the horizontal axis cor-
responds to the interim type. Each bar represents the allocation for each type, lighter grey indicates
lower probability of allocation while darker grey indicates higher probability of allocation. White rep-
resents no allocation and black full allocation. From panel (a) to (d) the fractions, αk, for each type
are: (0.7, 0.2, 0.05, 0.05), (0.4, 0.1, 0.4, 0.1), (0.3, 0.2, 0.4, 0.1) and (0.25, 0.25, 0.1, 0.4), respectively.
7 Conclusion
We considered the scope of sequential screening in the presence of ex-post participation constraints.
The ex-post participation constraints limit the ability of the seller to extract surplus from the buyer.
As the buyer has to be willing to participate in the contractual arrangement following every realization
of her value, the surplus has to be extracted ex-post rather than at the interim level.
Despite these ex-post restrictions sequential screening frequently allows the seller to increase his
revenue beyond the statically optimal revenue. The gains from sequential screening become more pro-
nounced to the extent that the interim types differ in their willingness to pay. A natural implementation
of the optimal mechanism simply offers the buyer the choice among different menus in the first stage.
The choice of menu in the first period merely restricts the possible choices in the second period. In
particular, it is not necessary to ask the buyer for any transfer before the final transaction occurs.
Moreover, the buyer only has to make a transfer if she receives the object.
In contrast to the static solution where an optimal policy is always to sell the maximum quantity
of 1, the sequential screening policy offers intermediate quantities. This departure from the bang-bang
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policy in a linear utility setting arises due to the presence of the ex-post participation constraint in
conjunction with the incentive compatibility constraints.
There are several natural directions to extend the present work. Our stronger results were for the
case of binary interim types while allowing for a continuum of values for each type. We also presented
an extension of Theorem 1 to multiple types as well as a characterization and numerical results for
exponential values. We would like to further explore the characterization of the optimal sequential
contract to multiple types and general value distributions. An interesting question here concerns the
number of randomization intervals per type and whether the number of intermediate allocations increases
with the number of interim types. Also, is there a fixed number of intermediate allocations that yield a
good approximation to the optimal solution for an arbitrary number of interim types? Similarly, is there
a fixed number of contracts that yield a good approximation to the optimal solution for an arbitrary
number of interim types?
We might also be interested in analyzing how the number of competing buyers may affect the nature
of the optimal mechanism. This has important practical consequences particularly in industries that
use market mechanisms like auctions, such as display advertising alluded at the beginning of the paper.
We note that this extension is not immediate, because with multiple buyers we may lose the threshold
structure of the optimal static allocation. However, we conjecture that in this case an approximately
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A Appendix: Proofs of Main Results
The appendix contains the proof to all results except for the results related to the exponential distri-
butions which are contained in the supplementary appendix B.
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof of this result is standard and thus omitted.
Proof of Lemma 2. The fact that the optimal solution is a threshold allocation is explained in the
main text. Thus, we only need to provide a proof for θ̂ being in the interval [θ̂1, θ̂K ]; but this is exactly
Lemma 1 in Krähmer and Strausz (2014).
Proof of Theorem 1. We first show the sufficiency of our condition and then its necessity. We
denote by Ω the space of non-decreasing allocations, that is,
Ω , {x : [0, θ]→ [0, 1] : x(·) is non-decreasing}.
Sufficiency. We assume condition (APR) holds, we want to verify the static contract is optimal.
In order to do so we dualize the incentive constraints. The Lagrangian is

















where wL, wH correspond to the multipliers for the ex-post IR constraints, and λ ∈ {λHL, λLH} to the
multipliers for incentive constraints. In the Lagrangian above we have chosen the multipliers as follows
wL = αL − αHrHH(θ̂), wH = αH + αHrHH(θ̂), λHL = αLrLH(θ̂), λLH = 0, (A-1)
these multipliers are non-negative because rHH(θ̂) ≤ 0, rLH(θ̂) ≥ 0 and
wH = αH + αHr




(θ̂)⇔ θ̂ ≥ 0.
Hence, maximizing the Lagrangian over non-decreasing allocation xL and xH yields an upper bound
for the relaxed problem. Note that this choice of multipliers eliminates the uL and uH terms in the
Lagrangian. We next show that under (APR) the solution to the Lagrangian relaxation is the static

















To prove this first note that the optimal solution xL on the left hand side of (A-2) must be of the
threshold type, that is, xL(θ) = 1{θ≥θ?}, because xL(·) is non-decreasing (see, e.g., Myerson (1981) or











dz, ∀θ? ∈ [0, 1].
Replacing the value of λHL, this equation can be cast over values θ
?











, ∀θ?1 ≤ θ̂ ≤ θ?2 (A-3)
Condition (APR) ensures the equation above always hold. Indeed, condition (APR) implies that for












Taking ε ↓ 0 yields the left hand side inequality in (A-3). The right hand side inequality in (A-3) can
be verified using an analogous argument. This shows (A-2), that is, the static contract maximizes the
part of the Lagrangian that corresponds to interim type L. We now prove the same for type H. Note









































where in (a) we have used the definition of rHH(·) and in (b) our assumption that rHH(·) is increasing.
Thus, we have proved that for this choice of Lagrange multipliers the static contract maximizes the
Lagrangian. Since the value of the Lagrangian coincides with the primal objective at the static solution,
and this solution is always primal feasible. We conclude that the static contract is optimal.
Necessity. We defer this proof to the proof of Proposition 1. In it we show that whenever condition
(APR) is not satisfied, there is a contract different from the static one with a strictly larger revenue.
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Proof of Proposition 1. Assume (APR) does not hold, then by Lemma A-1 (which we state and














Consider a contract in which we set uL = uH = 0, and
xL(θ) =

0 if θ < θ1
x if θ1 ≤ θ ≤ θ2
1 if θ2 < θ,
xH(θ) =







FH(z)dz. We next show that this solution is feasible and that yields an
strict revenue improvement over the static contract.
Feasibility. The ex-post participation constraints are clearly satisfied. Also, since θ1 < θ̂ < θ2










































note that we are using here that by Lemma A-1 the denominator on the right hand side is strictly
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note that we are using here that by Lemma A-1 the denominator on the left hand side is strictly positive.
This inequality together with (A-6) yields (A-5) and, therefore, the proposed solution is feasible.
Revenue improvement. We need to prove that∫ θmax
θ̂








































RLH(θ, θ̂) > min
θ̂≤θ≤θ
RLH(θ̂, θ).



















Proof of Lemma A-1. Note that both RLH(·, θ̂) and RLH(θ̂, ·) are continuous functions. Thus
the maximum and the minimum in the statement are achieved by some θ̃a ∈ [0, θ̂] and θ̃b ∈ [θ̂, θ],
respectively. Therefore, by assumption, we have that
RLH(θ̃a, θ̂) > R
LH(θ̂, θ̃b).
Using the continuity of both function we can find θa < θ̂ and θb > θ̂ such that the inequality above is
satisfied.




LH(z)dz. Note that since θb > θ̂ ≥ θ̂L (see Lemma 2) we
have RLH(θ̂, θb) > 0. Therefore, R
LH(θa, θ̂) > 0 which imply the desired inequalities.













s.t xk(θ) non-decreasing, ∀k ∈ {L,H}








We separate this proof into two parts. In part 1 we show that the optimal solution has the structure
in the statement of the theorem. Note that it is enough to provide a proof for the structure of the
allocation, the transfers can be readily derived from Lemma 1. In part 2 we derive the properties about
the thresholds, xL and uH and uL.
Part 1. For any optimal solution to (PR) two possible situations may arise: (1) One where the
allocation has at least one interval in which it is continuously strictly increasing; (2) another where the
allocation does not have an interval in which it is continuously strictly increasing, but it is a piecewise
constant non-decreasing function.
For each interim type, we prove that if we are in case (1), we can modify the allocation in that
interval to be constant and obtain at least a weak improvement in the objective. This implies that
for any optimal allocation, we can construct another optimal allocation that is a piecewise constant
non-decreasing function. Therefore, we can always assume we are in case (2). In this case, we show that
for interim type L there is only one intermediate step, and for interim type H there is no intermediate
step.
We split the proof in interim type L and H. Let x?L(θ) and x
?
H(θ) denote the optimal allocations.
We begin with interim type L.
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Interim type L case (1): Suppose there is an interval (θ1, θ2) in which x
?
L(θ) is continuously
strictly increasing. Before we start with the main argument, note that if θ̂L > θ1 then we can set x
?
L(θ)
to be equal to x?L(θ1) for all θ in (θ1, θ̂L). This strictly increases the objective function while maintaining
feasibility. So we can assume θ̂L ≤ θ1, which in turn implies that µL(·) is non-negative in the interval
(θ1, θ2).
Now we give the main argument. Note that by Theorem 1 in Luenberger (1969, p. 217), x?L(θ) must
maximize the Lagrangian:6

















with λ,wL, wH ≥ 0. Define LL(·) by
LL(θ) , αLµL(θ)fL(θ)− λFH(θ),
then it must be the case that LL(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ (θ1, θ2). Suppose this is not true, then we could
have θ̄ ∈ (θ1, θ2) such that LL(θ̄) > 0, since LL(·) is a continuous function this must also be true for
all θ ∈ (θ̄ − ε, θ̄ + ε) for ε > 0 small enough. But then we can obtain a strict improvement by setting
xL(θ) = x
?
L(θ̄ + ε) for all θ ∈ (θ̄ − ε, θ̄ + ε). A similar argument holds when LL(θ̄) < 0. Therefore, we




= λ ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ (θ1, θ2), (A-7)
















6To use this theorem we need to verify that there is a feasible solution that strictly satisfies all inequalities. We can
take uL = uH > 0, xL(θ) = 1{θ≥θL} and xH(θ) = 1{θ≥θH} with θH < θL.
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where in the equality we have used (A-7). Now, consider modifying x?L to be x̃
?
L equal to x
?
L(θ̄) in
(θ1, θ2). Then from (A-7), (A-8) and (A-9) we get∫ θ2
θ1













































where in (a) we used equation (A-8).
Interim type L case (2): Suppose for x?L(·) there exists θ1 < θ2 < θ3 and 0 < x1 < x2 < 1 such
that x?L(θ) = x1 in (θ1, θ2) and x
?
L(θ) = x2 in (θ2, θ3). Since type’s L allocation is piecewise constant
we must have x?L(θ
−





Then, the part of objective associated to interim type L in these intervals is
αL · x1 ·
∫ θ2
θ1




If µL(θ̄) ≤ 0 for some θ̄ ∈ (θ1, θ3) then because of (IHR), µL(θ) ≤ 0 for all θ ≤ θ̄ and, therefore, we can
always find a better solution by setting x?L(θ) = 0 for all θ ≤ θ̄ (note that this does not affect feasibility





















, consider decreasing x2 by ε2 > 0 and increasing x1 by ε1 > 0, in




FH(z)dz − ε2 ·
∫ θ3
θ2
FH(z)dz = 0. (A-12)
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which under our current assumption is non-negative. So we can weakly improve our objective, indeed
we can do it so until x1 + ε1 and x2 − ε2 are equal,















since x2 > x1 we have ε2 > 0 and, therefore, we have shown that it is possible to increase x1 and to













, consider increasing x2 by ε2 > 0 and decreasing x1 by ε1 > 0
in such a way that equation (A-11) remains with equality. By doing this the change in the objective








3 ). This proves the result for
interim type L and case (2).
In conclusion, putting together what we have proved for type L in cases (1) and (2), we can al-
ways consider x?L to be a step function with at most one intermediate step as in the statement of the
proposition. Now we proceed with interim type H.
Interim type H case (1): Suppose there is an arbitrary interval (θ1, θ2) in which x
?
H(θ) is contin-
uously strictly increasing. Before we start with the main argument, note that if θ̂H < θ2 then we can
set x?H(θ) to be equal to x
?
H(θ2) for all θ in (θ̂H , θ2). This strictly increases the objective function and
maintains feasibility. So we can assume θ̂H ≥ θ2, which in turn implies that µH(·) is non-positive in the
interval (θ1, θ2).
Now we give the main argument. Note that by Theorem 1 in Luenberger (1969, p. 217), x?H(θ)
must maximize the Lagrangian

















with λ,wL, wH ≥ 0. Define LH(·) by
LH(θ) , αHµH(θ)fH(θ) + λFH(θ),
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then it must be the case that LH(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ (θ1, θ2). Suppose this is not true, then we could
have θ̄ ∈ (θ1, θ2) such that LH(θ̄) > 0, since LH(·) is a continuous function this must also be true for
all θ ∈ (θ̄ − ε, θ̄ + ε) for ε > 0 small enough. But then we can obtain an strict improvement by setting
x2(θ) = x
?
H(θ̄ + ε) for all θ ∈ (θ̄ − ε, θ̄ + ε). A similar argument holds when LH(θ̄) < 0. Therefore, we




= −λ, ∀θ ∈ (θ1, θ2). (A-14)
















where in the equality we have used (A-14). Now, consider modifying x?H to be x̃
?
H equal to x
?
H(θ̂) in
(θ1, θ2). Then from (A-14), (A-15) and (A-16) we get∫ θ2
θ1













































where in (a) we used equation (A-15).
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Interim type H case (2): Suppose x?H(·) is an optimal solution to (PR) for which there exists
θ1 < θ2 and 0 < x < 1 such that x
?
H(θ) = x in (θ1, θ2). Similar to the proof of type L assume
x?H(θ
−




2 ). Then the part of the objective for the interim type H in this interval is




If µH(θ̄) ≥ 0 for some θ̄ ∈ (θ1, θ2) then because of (IHR), µH(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ≥ θ̄ and, therefore, we can
always find a better solution by setting x?H(θ) = 1 for all θ ≥ θ̄ (note that this does not affect feasibility








otherwise we could decrease x and obtain an strict improvement in the objective. Now, consider splitting










We can modify x?H(θ) in (θ1, θ2) as follows and obtain an, at least weak, objective improvement. For
θ ∈ (θ1, θ̄) set x?H(θ) = x − ε1 and for θ ∈ (θ̄, θ2) set x?H(θ) = x + ε2 with ε1, ε2 > 0, and such that






















which by equation (A-18) is non-negative. Then we can keep increasing ε2 until either x− ε1 = x?H(θ
−
1 )




2 ). This proofs we can, at least weakly, improve the objective. It also proves that we
can modify the solution in such a way that for one of the two halves of the intervals the step reaches the
boundary bound given by either x?H(θ
−




2 ). For the half that did not reach the boundary, we
can do the same procedure described above and then repeat this procedure until we completely get rid






2 )). Note that this process can be potentially infinite,
in which case a more rigorous argument is required.
Suppose the process described above goes for infinitely many steps. In this case, an allocation
sequence {xnH(θ)}n∈N defined in [θ1, θ2] is generated. To prove that the argument works, we need to
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To prove this, let {θn, θn, θ̃n}n∈N be the sequence generated in the infinite process where: θn and θn
correspond to the lower and upper bound of the interval. For example, at the beginning θ1 = θ1 and
θ1 = θ2. At the next iteration we will have either θ2 = θ1 and θ2 = θ̄ or θ2 = θ̄ and θ2 = θ2. Note that
for all n ∈ N: θn, θn ∈ [θ1, θ2]. θ̃n is defined to be the half of the interval. So θ̃1 = θ̄, and θ̃2 = (θ2+θ2)/2.
From these definitions we have that θn and θn are bounded monotone sequences (the first non-





then all three quantities, θn, θn and θ̃n, converge to the same limit which we denote by θ∞ ∈ [θ1, θ2] (if
the limit was not the same we could continue iterating the process).From this we can conclude that the








1 ) if θ < θ∞
x?H(θ
+
2 ) if θ ≥ θ∞,
∀θ ∈ [θ1, θ2].
Finally, we can use the almost surely version of the dominated convergence theorem to obtain (A-19).
This completes the proof for interim type 2 and case (2).
In conclusion, putting together what we have proved for type H in cases (1) and (2), we can always
consider x?H to be a threshold allocation as in the statement of the proposition.














s.t x ∈ [0, 1], θ1 ≤ θ2











We prove the properties satisfied by uL, θ1, θH and θ2. From the formulation above it is clear that is
always optimal to set uL = 0. To see that θ̂L ≤ θ1 suppose the opposite, that is, θ̂L > θ1. This implies
that between θ1 and θ̂1, µL(·) is negative. Then, we can increase θ1 while keeping feasibility and, at the
same time, increasing the objective function. Note this argument is also valid when θ1 = θ2. Also, note
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that we can obtain a strict improvement only when x > 0; however, when x = 0 we can only obtain a
weak improvement. In either case, we can always consider θ̂L ≤ θ1. And to see that θH ≤ θ̂H suppose
the opposite, θH > θ̂H . Since µH(θ) > 0 for all θ ≥ θ̂H , we can can decrease θH and obtain an objective
improvement while maintaining feasibility.











otherwise, we could decrease uH and, by doing so, improve the objective. Since uH > 0, equation (A-20)
yields

























which implies ∫ θ1
θH
FH(z)dz < 0,
a contradiction. Thus, θ1 < θH .
Now consider, a new contract for type H which consists on decreasing the cut-off θH by ε > 0
sufficiently small, but at the same time maintaining the equality in equation (A-20). Specifically, let











note that by taking ε small we still have uH(ε) > 0. We claim that this new contract, characterized by
θ1, θ2, x, θH(ε) and uH(ε), yields a larger objective that the old contract, characterized by θ1, θ2, x, θH























We obtain a similar expression for the new contract’s objective. Specifically, the first two terms in the
expression above are the same and the third term differs in θH . Hence, the new contract yields an






Since θH(ε) < θH this last inequality is true. Thus, if uH > 0 we can always construct a new contract
yielding a larger objective value and, therefore, at any optimal contract we must have uH = 0.





















which implies θH = θ2, a contradiction.
Next we argue that θ1 ≤ θH . First we show that θ1 ≤ θ̂H . Suppose the opposite, that is, θ1 > θ̂H .



























That is, the incentive constraint is not binding. Therefore, since θ1 > θ̂H ≥ θ̂L we can slightly decrease
θ1 and, in this way, obtain an objective improvement whenever x > 0. When x = 0, because θ2 ≥ θ1,
we can decrease θ2 and obtain an objective improvement as well. Hence, at any optimal solution we
must have θ1 ≤ θ̂H .









Using that θ1 ≤ θ̂H implies θH < θ̂H , we can slightly increase θH (maintaining feasibility) and thus
obtain an objective improvement. In conclusion, at any optimal solution we must have θ1 ≤ θH .
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FH(z)dz. Indeed, since θ̂L ≤ θ, the part of the
objective that involves x is always non-negative and, therefore, it is optimal to make x as large as possi-








Proof of Theorem 2. We next show that the solution to the relaxed problem and the original
problem coincide. It is enough to show that the solution of (PR) is feasible in (P). From Theorem 3 we


























Let θ1, θH , θ2 and x be the optimal solution to (PR). If this solution corresponds to the optimal static
contract or yields the same objective than it, we are done because this contract is always feasible in
(P). If this solution is different from the optimal static contract and yields a strictly larger objective,












This is true because the contract (u1, u2, x1, x2) = (0, 0,1{θ≥θH},1{θ≥θH}) is a feasible static contract
and, therefore, its associated revenue is bounded by that of the optimal static contract. From the














Also, since x ≤ 1 we must have θ1 < θH . Note that since θ̂L ≤ θ1 < θ2 the denominator above is strictly
positive.
Now we argue that the contract optimizing (PR) characterized by θ1, θH , θ2 and x is feasible for (P).
Since the high to low incentive constraint is satisfied, we only need to verify the low to high incentive


















FL(z)dz. In order to see why (A-24) holds, observe that from





























































Using this, together with equation (A-23), delivers equation (A-24). This concludes the proof .
Lemma A-2 Let θi ∈ [0, θ] for i = 1, 2, 3 be such that θ1 < θ2 < θ3. Also, consider functions f, g :





















































































Proof of Theorem 3. In Lemma A-3 (which we state and prove after this proof) we show that A is
non-empty. Next we prove the necessary and sufficient condition.
We prove both directions separately. First we show that if there exists λ ∈ A satisfying the properties
then the static contract is optimal. Then we show that if the static contract is optimal then we can
always solve for λ satisfying the properties.
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Define
Ω , {x : [0, θ] −→ [0, 1] : x(·) is non-decreasing}, and ΩK , Ω× · · · × Ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
K times
.
For the first part we use a Lagrangian relaxation approach. That is, we dualize the incentive constraints
for a specific set of multipliers. This gives an upper bound to the seller’s problem. Then we show that






























where λ correspond to the multipliers associated with the incentives, and w to the multipliers associated
with the ex-post IR constraints. Let us define λ to be equal to the (λij)i,j∈{1,··· ,K}2 we are assuming to
exist, that is λ ∈ A, and let






λkj ,∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. (A-26)
Note that by our choice of λ (λ ∈ A), wk is non-negative for all k. With this choice of w the first
summation in the Lagrangian becomes zero. Now, we need to show that for this choice of multipliers




































Note that the RHS of (A-27), for each k, is maximized at some threshold contract θk ∈ [0, 1]. So to
prove that (A-28) is an upper bound of (A-27) is enough to show that for all k and for any θk ∈ [0, 1]∫ θmax
θk
(























































dz, ∀θk ≥ θ̂,



































dz, ∀θk ≤ θ̂,






















In summary, proving that (A-29) holds is equivalent to showing that both (A-30) and (A-31) hold. To












θ̂ F j(z)dz∫ θ
θ̂ F k(z)dz
=
αk · µk(θ̂) · fk(θ̂)−
∑









where the last equality comes from the choice of the multipliers. Since the limit is taken for values


























































Since we are assuming that the minimum is an upper bound to the maximum above, we can conclude
that both (A-30) and (A-31) hold (with equality). This concludes the proof for the first direction.
For the second direction we need to show that if the static contract is optimal then we can find
λ satisfying condition (APRM ). Theorem 1 in Luenberger (1969, p. 217) gives then the existence of
Lagrange multipliers such that the static contract maximizes the Lagrangian(here we use the interior
point condition in the assumptions). In other words, ∃λ,w ≥ 0 such that
L(xs,0,λ,w) ≥ L(x,u,λ,w), ∀u,x ∈ RK+ × ΩK . (A-33)















, ∀u ∈ RK+ .
Which implies that






λjk = 0, ∀k,








as required. Now, fix k and consider a solution x ∈ ΩK such that xj , xs for all j 6= k and xk is 1{θ≥θk}
for some θk ∈ [0, 1]. Then equation (A-33) delivers equation (A-29). And we already saw that (A-29) is





































that is, condition (APRM ) holds for any k. We only need to check that λ ∈ A. Observe that both the
maximum and the minimum are bounded from below and above (respectively) by
αk · µk(θ̂) · fk(θ̂)−
∑
j:j 6=k λjk · F j(θ̂)
F k(θ̂)
. (A-34)
To see this we can take the limit as before. For the maximum we take the limit of θ approaching to θ̂
from below. This limit converges to the expression in (A-34) and is bounded above by the maximum.
A-18
The same argument applies to the minimum but this time taking the limit from above θ̂. In turn implies
that
αk · µk(θ̂) · fk(θ̂)−
∑








and we can conclude that λ ∈ A.
Lemma A-3 The set B ⊂ A defined by
B ,
{
(λij)i,j∈{1,··· ,K}2 ≥ 0 :
∑
j 6=k







λkj , ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}
}
,
is non-empty. Hence, the set A is non-empty.
Proof of Lemma A-3. We want to show that B 6= ∅, which amount to proving that the linear system
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
λjk · F j(θ̂) = αk · µk(θ̂) · fk(θ̂) + F k(θ̂) ·
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
λkj , ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K},
αk = wk +
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
λkj ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K},
with (λ,w) ≥ 0 has a solution. We begin by writing down the system with matrices and then we apply
Farkas’ lemma.
First, the vector λ is given by
(λ12, λ13, · · · , λ1K︸ ︷︷ ︸
Type1
, λ21, λ23, · · · , λ2K︸ ︷︷ ︸
Type2
, · · · , λK1, λK2, · · · , λKK−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
TypeK
),
note that the terms λkk for any k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} do not form part of the vector. Now, consider matrix A
with K(K − 1) +K columns and 2K rows given by
A =
F1 F2 · · · FK 0K×K
B1 B2 · · · BK IK×K
 ,
where 0K×K is the zero matrix of dimension K × K and IK×K is the identity matrix of dimension
K ×K. Also, Fk and Bk are matrices of dimension K × (K − 1) defined by
Fkij =

−F k(θ̂) if i = k
F k(θ̂) if i < k, j = i
F k(θ̂) if i > k, j = i− 1
0 if o.w,
Bkij =
1 if i = k0 if o.w.
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Finally, let b be a vector defined by b = (αLµ1(θ̂)f1(θ̂), α2µ2(θ̂)f2(θ̂), · · · , αKµK(θ̂)fK(θ̂), αL, · · · , αK).




 = b, λ,w ≥ 0.
Now we use Farkas’ lemma, if this system does not have a solution then it must be the case that the




 ≥ 0, bᵀ ·
yF
yB
 < 0. (A-35)
Explicitly, we have (yF , yB) solve
F k(θ̂) · (yFj − yFk ) + yBk ≥ 0, ∀k, ∀j 6= k
yBk ≥ 0, ∀k
K∑
k=1
αkµk(θ̂)fk(θ̂) · yFk +
K∑
k=1
αk · yBk < 0.
Let yFm be equal to mink{yFk } (m is the index that achieves the minimum) then
K∑
k=1

















θ̂ − F k(θ̂)
fk(θ̂)
)







































a contradiction. Where in (a) we use the fact that
∑K
k=1 αkµk(θ̂)fk(θ̂) = 0, in (b) we use the definition
of yFm, in (c) we use the first set of equations in (A-35).
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Proof of Proposition 5. We apply Theorem 3. In particular, we establish that under three condition
in the statement of the proposition we can find λ such that condition (APRM ) is satisfied.




j 6=k λjkF j(z)
F k(z)
. (A-36)
We next show that under any of two conditions in the statement of the proposition we can always find
λ ∈ A such that (APRM ) holds. To prove this, it is enough to verify that (a) Lk(z) ≤ Lk(θ̂) for all
z ≤ θ̂, and (b) Lk(z) ≥ Lk(θ̂) for all z ≥ θ̂, for some suitable λ ∈ A, for all k. Indeed, if such λ exists

































which is precisely (APRM ). The first inequality above comes from (a) and the second from (b).
To conclude we next verify conditions (a) and (b). We start by choosing λ ∈ A such that αk ≥∑
j 6=k λjk, for all k. Lemma A-3 guarantees the existence of such λ. Next note that because λ ∈ A we
have that Lk(θ̂) = −
∑







λjkF j(z) ≤ 0, ∀z ≤ θ̂, ∀k.
Note that (αk −
∑
j 6=k λkj) ≥ 0 for all k. If condition (i) holds, we can divide the inequality above by
fk(z) and use that F j(z)/fk(z) is non-increasing for any j(this is true under (i)) to conclude that the
resulting function on the left hand side is non-decreasing. If condition (ii) holds then because all F j(z)
are non-increasing functions and zfk(z) is non-decreasing then the resulting function on the left hand
side is non-decreasing. In conclusion the left hand side in the equation above is bounded above by its
value at θ̂; but since λ ∈ A, this value equals zero. This establishes (a). Condition (b) can be verified
in an analogous manner.
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B Proofs for Leading Example: Exponential Distribution
The supplementary appendix, possibly for online publication, contains the proofs for all the results
related to the exponential distribution.
Proof of Lemma 3. From Lemma 2 we have that θ̂L ≤ θ̂ ≤ θ̂H . For exponential distributions,
θ̂L = 1/λL and θ̂H = 1/λH . Therefore, θ̂ ∈ [1/λL, 1/λL]. Moreover, θ̂ must satisfy (8), if not we could
increase it or decrease and obtain an strict revenue improvement.
We provide a proof for the rest of the properties for general distributions satisfying (IHR). Note first
that θ̂ can be seen as a function of αL and αH but since αH equals 1− αL, we can effectively consider
θ̂ just a function of αL. Then, when αL equals 0 is as we only had type H buyers and, therefore,
the optimal threshold is θ̂H . While when αL equals 1 is as we only had type L buyers so the optimal
threshold is θ̂L. Hence, θ̂(0) equals θ̂H and θ̂(1) equals θ̂L.













αLfL(z)µL(z) + (1− αL)fH(z)µH(z)dz,
note that this is a linear function of αL and, for fixed αL, it is maximized at θ̂(αL). Hence,
`(θ̂(αaL), α
b
L) ≤ `(θ̂(αbL), αbL)
= `(θ̂(αbL), α
b
L − αaL) + `(θ̂(αbL), αaL)







Recall that θ̂ is in [θ̂L, θ̂H ] and, therefore, θ̂L ≤ θ̂(αaL) < θ̂(αbL) ≤ θ̂H . This in turn implies that
µL(z) > 0 and µH(z) < 0, ∀z ∈ (θ̂(αaL), θ̂(αbL)),
so for z in (θ̂(αaL), θ̂(α
b
L)) we have
αaLfL(z)µL(z) + (1− αaL)fH(z)µH(z) < αbLfL(z)µL(z) + (1− αbL)fH(z)µH(z),
which contradicts (B-1).




{ θ̂e−λLθ̂ − θe−λLθ









Before we begin the proof we need some definitions and observations. Define the following functions
g(θ) ,
θ̂e−λLθ̂ − θe−λLθ
e−λH θ̂ − e−λHθ
and g(θ) ,
θe−λLθ − θ̂e−λLθ̂


















· e−θ̂(λL−λH) ≤ θ̂ · e−θ̂(λL−λH) ⇐⇒ θ̂ ≤ 1
λL − λH
. (B-5)





From equations (B-3),(B-4) and (B-5) we see that






{ θ̂e−λLθ̂ − θe−λLθ





e−λHθ − e−λH θ̂
}
(B-7)
contradicting the fact that condition (APR) holds.
For the other direction, assume equation (9) holds. We first prove that for θ ≤ θ̂ we have g(θ) ≤ g(θ̂),
indeed
g(θ) ≤ g(θ̂)⇐⇒ θ̂e
−λLθ̂ − θe−λLθ
e−λH θ̂ − e−λHθ
≤ (λLθ̂ − 1)
λH
· e−θ̂(λL−λH)
⇐⇒ λH · (θ̂e−λLθ̂ − θe−λLθ) ≥ (e−λH θ̂ − e−λHθ) · (λLθ̂ − 1) · e−θ̂(λL−λH)
⇐⇒ λH θ̂ · (1−
θ
θ̂
e−λL(θ−θ̂))− (1− e−λH(θ−θ̂)) · (λLθ̂ − 1) ≥ 0,
so we just need to see that this last inequality holds for θ ≤ θ̂. For doing so define
H(θ) , λH θ̂ · (1−
θ
θ̂
e−λL(θ−θ̂))− (1− e−λH(θ−θ̂)) · (λLθ̂ − 1),
and note that H(θ̂) = 0 and
H(0) = λH θ̂ + (e
λH θ̂ − 1) · (λLθ̂ − 1) ≥ λH θ̂ + λH θ̂(λLθ̂ − 1) = λH θ̂ · λLθ̂ > 0,
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where the inequality comes from convexity of the exponential function and the fact that θ̂ ≥ 1/λL.
Furthermore the derivative of H is given by
dH
dθ
= λH(λLθ − 1)e−λL(θ−θ̂) − λH(λLθ̂ − 1)e−λH(θ−θ̂),
and it can be easily verified that for θ ≤ θ̂ we have dH/dθ ≤ 0. This together to the facts that H(0) > 0
and H(θ̂) = 0 imply that g(θ) ≤ g(θ̂) for all θ ≤ θ̂. Which in turn implies
max
θ≤θ̂
{ θ̂e−λLθ̂ − θe−λLθ






Now we prove that for θ ≥ θ̂ we have g(θ) ≥ g(θ̂). Note that if we prove this we are done because this
and what we have just proven imply condition (APR). As before we do
g(θ) ≥ g(θ̂)⇐⇒ θe
−λLθ − θ̂e−λLθ̂
e−λHθ − e−λH θ̂
≥ (λLθ̂ − 1)
λH
· e−θ̂(λL−λH)
⇐⇒ λH(θ̂e−λLθ̂ − θe−λLθ) ≥ (λLθ̂ − 1) · (e−λH θ̂ − e−λHθ) · e−θ̂(λL−λH)
⇐⇒ λH(θ̂ − θe−λL(θ−θ̂))− (λLθ̂ − 1) · (1− e−λH(θ−θ̂)) ≥ 0,
note that the LHS of this last inequality is again the function H(·) but this time defined for θ ≥ θ̂. We
have H(θ̂) = 0. It is easy to prove that for θ̂ ≤ θ ≤ θ̃ the function H(θ) is increasing, and then for θ > θ̃
is decreasing, where θ̃ > θ̂ and dH(θ̃)/dθ = 0. Also,
lim
θ→∞
H(θ) = λH θ̂ − (λLθ̂ − 1) ≥ 0,
hence for θ ≥ θ̂ we have H(θ) ≥ 0 and, therefore, g(θ) ≥ g(θ̂) for all θ ≥ θ̂, as desired.














therefore, for any αL ∈ [0, 1] equation (9) is satisfied. Then by Proposition 2 we conclude that the static
contract is optimal for any αL ∈ [0, 1].
Proof of Corollary 2. First we show θ̂(·) is continuous from the right at zero. Let {αnL} ∈ [0, 1] be





and suppose θ̂(αnL) does not converge to θ̂(0) = 1/λH . That is,
∃ε > 0,∀n0, ∃n ≥ n0, |
1
λH







− θ̂(αnL)| > ε⇐⇒
1
λH
− θ̂(αnL) > ε.
This in turn means that we can create a subsequence {α`nL } ⊂ {αnL} such that
∀n, 1
λH
− ε > θ̂(α`nL ). (B-8)
But since θ̂(α`nL ) is a maximizer of Π




−λLθ̂(α`nL ) + (1− α`nL )θ̂(α
`n
L )e









because λL > λH we can bound the LHS above to obtain
θ̂(α`nL )e








−λH 1λH . (B-9)
Note that the function θe−λHθ has a unique maximum at θ = 1/λH and since θ̂(α
`n
L ) satisfies equation





−λH( 1λH +δ(ε)) > θ̂(α`nL )e
−λH θ̂(α`nL ), ∀n,













−λH 1λH , ∀n,
so taking the limit over n gives a contradiction. In conclusion we have proved that θ̂(·) is continuous
from the right at zero. Now, to finalize the proof recall that we are assuming λL > 2λH or equivalently
1
λH
> 1λL−λH . However, since θ̂(0) = 1/λH and θ̂(·) is continuous from the right we can always find







so thanks to Proposition 2, the sequential contract is optimal when we set αL > ᾱL. Note that the
same arguments is valid for 1/λL. That is, we can show that θ̂(αL) is continuos from the left at 1 and















hence in [ᾱH , 1] the static contract is optimal. All of this implies that since θ̂(·) is a non-increasing
function we can always find ᾱ ∈ (0, 1) with the desired property.
Proof of Corollary 3. Fix λH and αL. Suppose the result is not true, that is,




From this we can construct a sequence λnL ≥ 2λH such that
lim
n→∞
λnL =∞ and θ̂(λnL) ≤
1
λnL − λH
, ∀n ∈ N,















However, since θ̂(λnL) maximizes Π












−λH 1λH ≤ Πstatic(θ̂(λnL)).





−λH 1λH ≤ 0,
a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4. We use the sufficient conditions in Lemma B-1 (which we state and proof
after the present proof). First note that since the support of the exponential distribution is unbounded
from above, we can take θ2 =∞ which eliminates condition (1). Conditions (2) and (3) can be cast as
θ1e
−θ1(λL−λH) ≥ θe−θ(λL−λH) ∀θ ≥ 0 and αL · λHθ1e−θ1(λL−λH) = −αH · (λHθH − 1), (B-10)















What we need to check is that θ1 ≤ θH . First, we show








−λHθ1 < 0. (B-11)
To prove this inequality notice that since θ̂ is the optimal static cutoff we have
αLθ̂e
−λLθ̂ + αH θ̂e
−λH θ̂ ≥ αLθ1e−λLθ1 + αHθ1e−λHθ1 , (B-12)
then we have




−λHθ1)− αLe−λLθ1 − αHe−λHθ1
(a)
≤ λH(αLθ̂e−λLθ̂ + αH θ̂e−λH θ̂)− αHe−λHθ1
(b)
< λH(αLθ̂e
−λLθ̂ + αH θ̂e
−λH θ̂)− αHe−λH θ̂
= λHαLθ̂e
−λLθ̂ + λHαHe
















where (a) comes from equation (B-12), (b) is true because the function −e−λHθ increasing and θ1 < θ̂,
(c) comes from equation (8). And (d) comes from θ1 < θ̂. With this we have proven (B-11) and thus















































but replacing θ1 with 1/(λL − λH) in this last expression we get θH > θ1.
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Lemma B-1 The following conditions for the thresholds θ1 ≤ θH ≤ θ2 (as in Proposition 3) are
sufficient for their optimality in (PR):
1. RLH(θ1, θ2) ≤ minθ2≤θ RLH(θ2, θ);
2. maxθ≤θ2 R
LH(θ, θ2) ≤ RLH(θ1, θ2);
3. αL ·RLH(θ1, θ2) + αHrHH(θH) = 0.
Proof of Lemma B-1.
It is enough to prove that under this conditions the optimal contract characterized by (θ1, θH , θ2)
is optimal for (PR). To prove this we use a Lagrangian relaxation (we do not relax the monotonicity
constraints) and show that this relaxation is optimized by the contract characterized by (θ1, θH , θ2).
First, we establish some properties that can be derived from conditions (1) to (3). Condition (3)
implies that θ2 ≥ θ̂L; otherwise, θ1, θ2 < θ̂L which would imply that RLH(θ1, θ2) < 0. In turn, condition
(3) would give RHH(θH) > 0 which would imply that θ̂H < θH . Since θH ≤ θ2 we would have
θ̂H < θH ≤ θ2 < θ̂L, that is, θ̂H < θ̂L which is not possible. Moreover, condition (2) together with the
fact that θ2 ≥ θ̂L imply that θ1 ≥ θ̂L. This yields RLH(θ1, θ2) ≥ 0, and thus we can use condition (3)
again to deduce that θH ≤ θ̂H . In summary, θ̂L ≤ θ1 and θH ≤ θ̂H .
Now we provide the main argument. If θ1 = θ2, then we also have θ1 = θ2 = θH . Condition
(3) implies that the contract characterize by (θ1, θH , θ2) is the static contract. Conditions (1) and (2)
together yield (APR) and, therefore, from Theorem 1 we deduce that the static contract is optimal.
Next suppose that θ1 < θ2, and define
Ω , {x : [0, θ]→ [0, 1] : x(·) is non-decreasing}.
We use x? to denote the solution characterize by (θ1, θH , θ2). The Lagrangian for (PR) is


















consider the following multipliers
λ = αL ·RLH(θ1, θ2), wL = λ+ αL, wH = −λ+ αH ,
note that λ and wL are non-negative, and for wH we have
wH ≥ 0⇔ αH + αHrHH(θH) ≥ 0⇔ rHH(θH) ≥ −1⇔ [θH − hHH(θH)] ≥ −hHH(θH)⇔ θH ≥ 0,




















where we can reduce attention to threshold strategies because xL(·), xH(·) are non-decreasing (see, e.g.,
Myerson (1981) or Riley and Zeckhauser (1983)). If we are able to show that L(x,u,λ,w) evaluated at
our candidate solution is an upper bound for the RHS above we are done. Let’s begin with the second




































where in the first equality we used condition (3) and the inequality comes from the fact that rHH(·) is

















































which thanks to condition (1) in our hypothesis is true. A similar argument holds for θ ≤ θ2, but using
































we conclude that max(u,x)∈Ω L(u,x,λ,w) ≤ L(0,x?,λ,w), as required.
Proof of Proposition 6. We make use of Lemma B-2 which we state and prove after the present
proof. In that lemma we need to define the function













for any λ ≥ 0. For exponential distributions Lk(z|λ) becomes:

























Hence, Lk(·|λ) is concave, which means that it crosses zero at most two times. Using Lemma B-2 we
conclude that in the exponential case allocations have at most one step in which randomization occurs.
Lemma B-2 For any dual-feasible variable λ associated to the incentive constraints define













If Lk(z|λ) crosses zero at most p times then the optimal allocation xk has at most bp/2c intervals where
randomization occurs.
Proof of Lemma B-2. We divide the proof into two parts. In the first part we construct a new dual
problem and state the complementary slackness conditions. This part of the proof follows the general
theory of linear programming in infinite dimensional space developed by Anderson and Nash (1987). In
the second part we exploit the complementary slackness conditions to show that the optimal allocation
xk has at most bp/2c intervals where randomization occurs.
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Part 1. Define the cone of non-negative non-decreasing functions
K , {x : [0, θ]→ R|x is non-negative and non-decreasing function}.











s.t xk(·) ∈ K, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}
xk(θ) ≤ 1, ∀θ ∈ [0, θmax] ,∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}




xk(z)F̄k(z)dz ≥ uk′ +
∫ θmax
0
xk′(z)F̄k(z)dz, ∀k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
Note that the dual cone of K is
K∗ = {β :
∫ θ
θ
β(z)dz ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ [0, θ]}.
The Lagrangian is



































where βk are the dual variables associated with the monotonicity constraints, ηk are dual variables
associated with the constraints xk(θ) ≤ 1. While λ,w correspond to the dual variables associated with













λ`k = 0, ∀k






λ`kF̄`(z) = ηk(z)− βk(z), ∀k, ∀z ∈ [0, θmax]
λ,w, ηk(·) ≥ 0, βk ∈ K∗, ∀k.
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And we must have complementary slackness. That is, for the monotonicity constraints (the cone con-
straints) this means that if xk(·) changes at some θ then
∫ θ
θ βk(z)dz = 0. Also x(0) ·
∫ θ
0 β(z)dz = 0.
All of this for all k. And for the upper bound constraints we must have (1 − xk(θ)) · ηk(θ) = 0 for all
θ ∈ [0, θ] and for all k.
Part 2. Consider an optimal primal-dual pair. Let xk be the primal solution for interim type k,
and βk, ηk and λ,w the corresponding dual solutions. Observe that from dual feasibility we must have
fk(z) · Lk(z|λ) = ηk(z)− βk(z), ∀z ∈ [0, θ]. (B-14)
Let us denote by ẑ1 < · · · < ẑp the points where Lk(·|λ) crosses zero, and we let ẑ0 = 0 and ẑp+1 = θ.
Note that Lk(θ|λ) = α · θ > 0, and by the feasibility of λ we have Lk(0|λ) = −wk/fk(0) ≤ 0.
Let z?1 , inf{z ∈ [0, θ] : xk(z) = 1} (if xk(z) never equals 1 we take z?1 = θ). We can assume
that z?1 > 0, otherwise xk(z) would be equal to 1 everywhere in [0, θ] and the result would follow.
In turn, there has to be a change on xk around z
?




βk(z)dz = 0. Moreover, since xk(z) < 1 for all z < z
?
1 complementary slackness implies that
ηk(z) = 0 for all z < z
?
1 . Therefore, Eq. (B-14) becomes
fk(z) · Lk(z|λ) = −βk(z), ∀z ∈ [0, z?1). (B-15)
Let q be the largest index in {0, 1, . . . , p} such that ẑq ≤ z?1 . Note that z?1 ∈ [ẑq, ẑq+1]. We show the
following claim:
Claim 1. Lk(·|λ) is positive in (ẑq, ẑq+1) and z?1 = ẑq.
Proof of Claim 1. First suppose that Lk(·|λ) is positive in (ẑq, ẑq+1) we show that z?1 = ẑq. If
not then for any z ∈ (ẑq, z?1) we have Lk(z|λ) > 0 which thanks to Eq. (B-15) yields βk(z) < 0 for any













βk(z)dz < 0, (B-16)
but this contradicts the fact that βk ∈ K∗. That is, z?1 ≤ ẑq but since ẑq ≤ z?1 we conclude that
ẑq = z
?
1 . To complete the argument suppose Lk(·|λ) is negative in (ẑq, ẑq+1) then, in particular, Lk(·|λ)
is negative in (z?1 , ẑq+1) and from Eq. (B-14) we deduce that βk(z

















a contradiction. In the second bracket we use the fact that βk ∈ K∗. This concludes the proof of Claim
1.
This shows that xk(·) equals 1 in (ẑq, θ] and that it changes value at ẑq. Now, from Claim 1 we now
that Lk(·|λ) is negative in (ẑq−1, ẑq) and, therefore, from Eq. (B-15) we deduce that βk(·) is positive
in (ẑq−1, ẑq). This together with
∫ θ
z?1
βk(z)dz = 0 imply that xk(·) is constant in (ẑq−1, ẑq) (by means
of complementary slackness any change would yield a contradiction). Let’s denote the value of xk(·)
in (ẑq−1, ẑq) by χq. Note that of χq = 0 we are done. Similarly to what we did before we define
z?2 , inf{z ∈ [0, ẑq−1] : xk(z) = χq}. Note that z?2 < ẑq−1. If z?2 = 0 then we xk(·) equals χq for all
values below zq and, therefore, there is nothing more to prove. So assume z
?
2 > 0. If z
?
2 = ẑq−1 then
xk(·) changes value at ẑq−1 and, therefore, by complementary slackness
∫ θ
ẑq−1
βk(z)dz = 0. However,
Lk(·|λ) is positive in (ẑq−2, ẑq−1) which by Eq. (B-15) implies that βk is negative in (ẑq−2, ẑq−1) but
this would contradict the dual feasibility of βk. Hence, we can assume that z
?
2 < ẑq−1.
Let q2 be the largest index in {0, 1, . . . , q − 1} such that ẑq2 ≤ z?2 . Note that z?2 ∈ [ẑq2 , ẑq2+1]. As
before we can show that Lk(·|λ) is positive in (ẑq2 , ẑq2+1) and z?2 = ẑq2 . Note that this implies that the
value χq of xk(·) extends for at least two intervals, namely, (ẑq−2, ẑq−1) and (ẑq−1, ẑq).
The previous argument can be applied iteratively over all intervals defined by ẑ1 < · · · < ẑp. Since
in each step of the argument we cover two interval we deduce that there can be at most bp/2c different
value of χq′ where q
′ is defined in every step as we did before. Moreover, if Lk(0|λ) < 0 then in the
interval (0, ẑ1) the dual variable βk(·) is positive. Because
∫ θ
ẑ1
βk(z)dz = 0 (this follows from the steps
of the argument) and x(0) ·
∫ θ
0 β(z)dz = 0 we must have x(0) = 0 and so in the last interval xk equals
0.
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